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APPEARANCE AND MOMENTARINESS:
THE NATURE OF BEING BETWEEN NĀGĀRJUNA,
THE SARVĀSTIVĀDINS AND NEO-PARMENIDISM
FEDERICO DIVINO

ABSTRACT: In this article I will try to demonstrate the existence of points in common
between the eternalist instances of Parmenidean philosophy and the Buddhist formulations
made by some parts of the Abhidhamma, Nāgārjuna, and the Sarvāstivādins. These three
philosophies have numerous points in common with Emanuele Severino’s formulations from
the point of view of what is defined as neo-Parmenidism. The purpose of this article is to
demonstrate that the points in common between these systems of thought are due to a basic
affinity which, despite having led them to emphasize different themes, present similar reasoning
and logical consequences, which allow us to detect very strong points in common especially
on issues related to the conception of reality as unique and indivisible in the form of an absolute
totality, the eternity of Being, the interdependent nature of entities, and even the illusory
perception of worldly reality. Since this text is only an introduction to the problem, I will
examine the main issues, also analyzing the main problems to conclude with what I have found
to be the actual points in common on which an interdisciplinary dialogue can be built between
the problems raised by Severino through Parmenides and Nāgārjuna who from this point of
view is more similar to the Sarvasarvādins than has been thought up to now.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For over two centuries after Buddha’s death a tradition of studies centered on the
deepening and reanalysis of his doctrines has spread and is now known as the
Abhidhamma (Sanskrit: Abhidharma) literature. Although it is less studied than the
Theravāda Abhidhamma written in Pāli, there is also a tradition derived from a school
systematized in Bactria, the Sarvāstivāda, which has produced its own Abhidharma
today preserved mostly in Chinese.
The purpose of the Abhidharma is to analyze the psycho-physical phenomenal
reality down to its ultimate and not further divisible constitutive elements. The entities
________________________
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The purpose of the Abhidharma is to analyze the psycho-physical phenomenal reality
down to its ultimate and not further divisible constitutive elements. The entities
analyzed are called dharmas. The doctrine in question is distinguished, in particular,
by the conception it gives of dharmas, as they are considered constitutive elements of
an indivisible totality. In fact, the term Sarvāstivāda means “everything (sarva) exists
(asti)”.
Furthermore, the Vaibhāṣika current of the Sarvāstivāda differs from the more
orthodox Sautrāntikas, which in fact intend to refer only to the texts (sautra) and reject
the Abhidharmic theories, and instead puts forward a particular hypothesis: the threetemporal manifestation of dharmas in the past, present and future.
This theory appears particularly interesting since the aforementioned view of time
appears similar to that of some modern exponents of neo-Parmenidism who claim to
be able to find the basis for their hypothesis on the persistence of entities over time (or,
in other cases, the illusion of the passage of time) in the foundations of Parmenidean
thought.
A legitimate question arises spontaneously at this point. Is there a utility beyond
comparative philosophy that justifies the comparison between Greek and Buddhist
thought? Several parallels have been proposed that suggest a common matrix, or at
least a common influence, of the two philosophies and not the simple filiation from one
to the other. But there is much more for the question we are dealing with here. It is
possible that the two philosophical traditions had common problems to solve. Nathan
Tamblyn puts forward a hypothesis that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy would be comparable
to that of Parmenides for “strong parallels” (Tamblyn 2013). As we shall see, however,
the parallels can go much further back than Nāgārjuna’s work.
According to Tamblyn, the Zeno paradox reported in Plato’s Parmenides can be
explained through a Mādhyamika reading: “one thing on its own cannot be different. It
can only be different when compared to a second thing. Two things are thus dependent
on each other to show their unalikeness” (ibid., 136). The paradox lies in this: although
two entities (let’s say A and B) are different from each other, they are alike in their
being different (A≠B). With this, although they are unalike in their relationship from
one another, they are alike in their being mutually unalike. They are alike in being
unalike and so they are also interdependent (A⇔B).1
Specifically, if the world were to consist of a plurality of independent things, as common
sense suggests, then according to Zeno this leads to the paradox that such things would be
both like and unlike at the same time and in the same way, thus revealing the absurdity of
the original hypothesis. (ibid., 137)

1

We could also say it in another way: since the identity of A depends on its definition in opposition to
B, and vice versa that of B depends on its definition as non-A, there can be no identity of A without B
and vice versa. This entails the paradox that the identity of an entity A depends on the denial of the
identity of another entity B on which it (A) depends.
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Parmenides’ philosophy constantly warns against false conclusions, or false opinions
(dóxa) exactly as it happens for the distinction between the dve satye of Madhyamaka.
In a revelation of the goddess to Parmenides we also find another important element of
Buddhist philosophy, which is the dualistic constitution of conventional reality, to
which the Buddha opposes (advaita): “ignorant people distinguish things one from
another as opposites, the prime example being light and dark” (ibid., 138). Nāgārjuna
and Parmenides also have the same idea of causality, for which it is foolish to say that
something arises from nothing (ibid., 140).2
Finally, there are further possible parallels between the Parmenidean “what-is” and
the Nāgārjunian tattva. For Parmenides the “what-is” is a whole, it is complete and full
of itself, and for this reason inviolable or more simply “one” (ibid., 142). Nāgārjuna
makes it clear in his work that a totality is the only thing that can be given as
paramārtha, and that it is only erroneously perceived (as relative reality) as a set of
parts, but paramārtha is not merely the sum of several parts, but rather an indivisible
and non-dualistic totality (advaita), that is, without opposing entities (Jones, 2020).
Nāgārjuna and Parmenides are many centuries apart, but Nāgārjuna’s philosophy
is nothing more than a repurposing of concepts that are already found in the most
ancient Buddhism. There is essentially nothing invented or reworked in Nāgārjuna, if
not certainly the strength of the rigor and unassailable meticulousness with which he
expounds his theses. Parmenides and the Buddha are both temporally placed in the late
sixth or early fifth century BC. On the other hand, what is not easy to find in the two
philosophies are some subsequent consequences, which those who refer to those
thoughts have developed.3 We can think that, given the similarity in the premises, it
was logical that they would manifest similar developments, but we will see if this is the
case.
2. MANIFESTATION, APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE:
IS THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA ETERNALIST?
One of the greatest exponents of the neo-Parmenidean current was the philosopher
Emanuele Severino.4 His thought is very complex, but to an attentive reader it appears
2

Actually, Nāgārjuna structures all his thought on a fourfold denial which is precisely the model of the
catuṣkoṭi: “a being does not become from [another] being. A being does not become from a non-being.
A non-being does not become from a non-being. A non-being does not become from a being. A being
does not become from itself, nor from other-than-itself, nor simultaneously from itself and from another.
How, then, will it be born?” (na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo ’bhāvān na jāyate | nābhāvāj
jāyate ’bhāvo ’bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate || na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo ’bhāvān na jāyate | nābhāvāj
jāyate ’bhāvo ’bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate || MK 21.12-13).
3
Conger for example, believes that Parmenides’ philosophy develops in a clear anti-dualist key, which
however would presuppose knowledge of Zoroastrian thought, but also of Sāṃkhya (Conger 1952, 122123).
4
Although this is a common definition attributed to him, it should be noted that some of his students
distance themselves from this idea since “Severino’s philosophy is quite different from any form of
Parmenidism because it is an all-encompassing critique of nihilism (the so called ‘night path’ of Western
thought) taken by the same Parmenides, by post-Parmenidean metaphysics, and, finally, by
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to present numerous similarities with some currents of Buddhism. The synthesis of
Severino’s statements is the one that Professor Priest reports: “there is no change; and
so, in particular, if something exists it has always existed and will always exist. As he
puts it, ‘if Being were to become, it would not be – before its birth and after its
corruption’” (Priest 2020, 42).
Some would identify this idea as eternalism. Severino would reject this hypothesis,
as he has repeatedly reiterated on several occasions both in his writings and in public
that his thought takes adequate distances from both eternalism and nihilism.5
Describing the Sarvāstivāda movement at this point becomes complex. Some
interpret its name “everything (sarva) exists (asti)” as a form of existentialism, but it
must be said that this movement was also opposed by other schools as eternalist.
However, the Buddha repeatedly reiterates his position contrary to both nihilism
(ucchedavāda) and eternalism (sassatavāda) from which he distances himself
(Karunadasa 2018, 14). If this is true it means two possibilities: either the Sarvāstivāda
is not eternalist, or the eternalism to which the Buddha referred was different from that
of Sarvāstivādins. While nihilism is consistently described as an idea of non-being
(vibhava-diṭṭhi), eternalism is described simply as bhava-diṭṭhi. It must first be
understood whether the term bhava means something slightly different from simple
being. This understanding could change our conception of the idea of eternalism.
Among the problems not yet fully resolved regarding the correct interpretation of
the technical terms adopted in the Pāli canon there is undoubtedly the correct
interpretation of the verbs atthi and bhavati, which can perform both a copulative
function and, depending on the context, indicate the concept of “staying”, in the first
case, and to “become”, in the second case. Since they have always been treated as
synonyms, the possibility that these terms should instead be interpreted as very
different concepts would also imply the introduction of problems of an ontological
order in the Buddhist canon, since these verbs are often alternated in the same sentence,
precisely to indicate very different concepts that are opposed, as happens for example
in the Niruttipathasutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (22.62). For example, this alternation
can be seen in the expression “atthī ti, na tassa saṅkhā bhavissatī ti”, but this problem
is everywhere in the Pāli canon, and its resolution has not yet been found, although is
have been several proposals.6
contemporary thought. The essence of nihilism is the assumption that time and becoming (considered as
annihilation of something) are self-evident, and this initial major error is the basis of all the fundamental
logical and ontological errors of both Metaphysics (and metaphysically founded theology) and Science”
(Testoni 2019, 123-124).
5
Those familiar with ancient Buddhist thought will notice the Buddha’s similar intentions to distance
himself from both eternalisms (sassatavāda) and nihilisms (ucchedavāda), a vision that Nāgārjuna takes
up in the title of his own work, devoted to the middle way (madhyamaka) which makes the pair with the
median path (majjhimapātipadā) of ancient Buddhism. It should be noted, however, that while in
Severino the opposition to nihilism is evident and declared in his works, the rejection of eternalism as a
description of his thought has mostly occurred in public interventions, while it is more subtle in his
published works.
6
On March 10, 2014, Professor Peter Harvey held a meeting on this topic for the Oxford Center for
Buddhist Studies precisely to report this problem and advance possible solutions to be pursued in the
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In particular, in the passage we have just seen, the use of the verb atthi, whose
Indian root is “as”, is clearly distinguished from bhavissati, which comes from the root
“bhū”, from the context which, although traditionally understood as a synonym for “to
be”, the use, at least in Indian language, has two very different meanings. The idea of
atthi (Sanskrit asti) is stative: it indicates something that “is-there”, something that is
manifest in its existence.7
Sections of the kind in which an alternation of these verbs is presented, as well as
texts in which to understand the specific meaning of their use, or sections in which they
are even explained by the Buddha for what, according to his interpretation, they mean,
they are very numerous in Theravāda literature and it is presumed that this use is
analogous in the whole Buddhist lexicon, even in that of Sanskrit literature.
The verb atthi (Sanskrit ásti) is in fact referable to the Indo-European root *h1esfrom which the Greek estí and Latin est, while the verb bhavati, as referable to the root
*bhuh2-, is connected to the forms of the old English bēon (to be, to become) and the
Lithuanian būt (to be, to exist).
This choice in translating the verb atthi as a stative form of being while the verb
bhavati as a form of “becoming” is based on the analysis of the specific uses of the
verb atthi in its occurrences in the Pāli canon. On specific forms and uses of atthi it is
possible to detect useful mentions in Cardona (2014, 215). On the semantic proximity
between bhavati and its derived form hoti as a possible synonym of “becoming” is
already evident in the use made of it in the pillars of Aśoka as reported in Cardona
(ibid., 182, 190): “hoti ‘is, becomes’ (bhavati)”, and also “Pāli, bhava(ti) ‘is, becomes’
has this uncontracted form with bh- and a form with initial h- and contracted -o- < āva-” (ibid., 195, 215), and finally “bhūta- (bhavati/hoti)” (ibid., 216, 221). The
Buddha adopts this custom, see for example “the eight states of becoming” (bhavaṃ
aṭṭhamaṃ) mentioned in Ratanasutta.
The hypothesis that we want to bring into play in this context is that the
Sarvāstivādin propose a form of eternalism that is not in contradiction with the
foundations of Buddhism, as what they consider eternal and permanent in all times is
the “what-is” in a static form (asti) which is different from the idea of becoming
(bhavati) that pertains instead to the illusory dimension.
On the matter of time, the Sarvāstivāda is described as supporting the following
hypothesis: “everything exists everywhere, at all times and in every way” (Willemen,
et al. 1998,19). This pertains to the peculiar doctrine already expounded on the theory
linguistic field. The lecture was entitled Reflections on the nature of, and attitudes to, becoming (bhava)
in the Pāli tradition, and constitutes a fundamental point of reference from which to start.
7
The term bhavati, on the other hand, is more precisely understood with the meaning of becoming. It is
therefore peculiar what the Buddha says in this verse, with reference to the form (but then, similarly to
the past verses, he repeats the same formula also for sensation, semantic cognition, mental constructs,
and consciousness), which can “appear” (apātubhūta, lit. “manifested”, a term that has bhūta in itself as
a past participle proper to bhavati), and then, that it will become (bhavissatī). Interesting is also that the
sutta points out its conventional nature (paññatti) which, however, is thus harnessed in the conception
of bhavati: that is, the convention shapes the form a becoming fact. Different, as the Buddha himself
specifies, is something that can be an “is” (atthi) or even less a “was” (ahosi), however, using two terms
deriving from very distinct roots.
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of trikāla. It is not clear whether the affirmation of the existence of entities (dharmas)
in these three times indicates that the passage of time is only apparent. In other words,
it is not clear whether we are talking here about a persistence of the dharmas eternally
or rather about their eternal being as not subject to the passage of time.
It all starts with a reflection on causality (hetu). In fact, if the cognitive faculty
perceives a given phenomenon that arises before it, it is not possivle to affirm that
dharmas last only an instant, as their consequences persist over time: “if the visible,
perceived before by the organ of sight and therefore past, were no longer exist, mental
consciousness could not arise because of it” (ibid., 20).
Actually, this thesis would be denied if we affirmed that what the cognition
continues to perceive is not really the ‘true’ object, but a sort of cognitive copy that is
immediately made at the act of perception (i.e. of the contact between the perceptive
organ and the object). The question of the cognitive copy of entities is a very frequent
occurrence in Theravāda literature.8 The most valid argument of the Sarvāstivādins is
that which concerns direct causality: if we see the consequences of a certain
phenomenon, it is untenable to affirm that its causes cease to exist only because they
are no longer visible in the present.
There are four possible alternatives to explain this view (ibid., 21-26). Given that
there are generally three perceivable times as past (atīta), present (pratyutpanna) and
future (anāgata), a first hypothesis calls into question the transformations of becoming
(bhāvānyathātva) whereby entities maintain their substance (dravya) over time, but not
their essence (bhāva). This idea can be translated today into the law of conservation of
mass. A vase can be melted and shape-shifted, but the quantity and substance remain
the same. Another idea is that the temporal aspect is somehow present in the entities in
the form of a mark (lakṣaṇānyathātva), therefore an entity that reaches the past from
the present is endowed with the characteristic quality of the past, but also does not lose
that of the present or the future which it received in the same way when it had those
given temporal characteristics. The third hypothesis defends the substance alone
(dravya) while, as time changes, it believes that the state of the entity also varies
(avasthānyathātva). The last hypothesis calls into question the nomination. As time
changes, an entity also varies its nominal quality, and in fact we say of it that it is a
past, present or future entity. This idea is called the reciprocity process (anyonyathātva).
These three hypotheses are supported respectively by Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka,
Vasumitra and Buddhadeva.
8

According to the Buddhist texts, and particularly in the Abhidhamma literature, nominal expression
(kattu-sādhana) has a perceptual doubling as its implication. If we look to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta we see
that in the early Buddhist conception, the cognitive activity is seen as producing a series of perceived
doublets on which we must meditate: there is a body-in-the-body (kāye kāya), a mind-in-the-mind (citte
citta), a sensation-in-the-sensation (vedanāsu vedāna), an entity-in-the-entity (dhammesu dhamma). We
can explain this conception of cognitive doubling if we accept that for the Buddhists the idea of the thing
is not the thing itself, but rather a reified double of the thing. But the thing itself is also a conception
according to the Abhidhamma. Since this is the basis of meditation practice, it is essential to understand
what the Buddha meant when he talks to us about these splits. The nominal expression does exactly this:
imposing a distinction by division (abhede bheda-parikappanā) between agent and action, perceiver and
perceived, subject and object, and so on.
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The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya favors the third hypothesis by explaining it as a
functional question. Time is a series of states that come progressively into function. In
this sense, the future is the function (kāritra) which has yet to be activated. With this,
it seems that what is denied is nothing more than the becoming. For example, any acting
factor is itself eternal, as a self-identity (svabhāva), but its appearance is momentary
(kṣaṇika). We could summarize this vision as a relationship between the time in which
a phenomenon that appears is still visible, that is, standing (sthiti), and the moment in
which it disappears (anityatā). The question now is: when an entity disappears, does it
cease to exist? The answer of the Sarvastivāda is no: it continues to exist even in the
past. However, this implies denying the becoming. Indeed, if a thing became, it would
cease to exist as it was in the past and would arise as different from the future in the
present. Instead, what is stated is that the entity remains itself (svabhāva) in all times,
and what changes is its appearance, so it is our perception that deceives us that
something has become other than itself: “all things or elements are real in the past and
in the future, as they are real in the present” (ibid., 26). With this, however, we must
also point out a contradiction of the Sarvastivāda, which in fact states that for this
reason the three times exist separately (ibid.). This appears illogical for a philosophy
that is in any case based on interdependence and impermanence (aniccā). Therefore, it
is probable that the idea of separateness did not mean their being isolated and
independent, but their being clearly distinct.
3. THE APORIA OF LANGUAGE
BETWEEN NĀGĀRJUNA AND SEVERINO
It is believed that there is an incompatibility between the thought of Nāgārjuna and that
of the Sarvasarvādins, since, as Bronkhorst points out (Bronkhorst 2011, 55):
Nāgārjuna had already rejected the possibility that things – meaning dharmas, of course –
that never arose should pass away. Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda, viewed in this light, would
have developed under the influence, this time indirect, of the correspondence principle.
This principle rules out the possibility of something non-existent arising. And without
arising, there is no passing away.

This idea, however, would contradict what Murti argued when he wrote that
Nāgārjuna’s philosophy “is a very consistent form of absolutism” (Murti 2008, 147148). So, who is right? The hypothesis I want to put forward is that actually Nāgārjuna
was an absolutist, that opposed not so much to the eternalism of the Sarvasarvādins,
but rather to their easily misunderstood language. In fact, it appears evident that
Nāgārjuna’s is a disguised eternalism.
Let’s go back to Parmenides and his poem Perí Phýseōs. Parmenides’ philosophy
founds at the same time a coherent absolutism and an eternalism of this absolute which
he calls Being (frag. 2).
hē mèn hópōs éstin te kaì oŷk ésti mḕ eînai
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“it is and it’s impossible that is not” (v. 3)
hē d’hōs oŷk éstin te kaì hōs khreṓn esti mḕ eînai
“it isn’t and it is necessary that is not” (v. 5)

The Being is immobile because if it moved it would be subject to becoming, and
therefore it would become other than itself, and this would be impossible. From this
derives an implicit consideration: language describes a reality that is self-contradictory,
since, on the one hand, with the act of vocation, it declares the identity of every being
to itself, but, on the other, when it describes becoming it declares contradictorily that
the being becomes other than itself: “A has become B”, therefore if we say “A is B”,
we are also saying that “A is not A but it is B”.9
For Parmenides, Being is One because there cannot be two Beings: if one is being,
the other would not be the first, and would therefore be a non-being. In the same way,
if A is being, and B is different from A, then B is not. Something that is not (the) Being
cannot be, by definition. The multiplicity of beings that we see in the world would be
nothing more than the consequence of a false opinion (dóxa) which confuses infinite
aspects of being as different beings, distinct from each other. For Nāgārjuna this
distinction corresponds with the belief in an independent self. Parmenidean Being is
indivisible, because otherwise it would require the presence of non-being as a
separating element.
For Parmenides, Being is immutable because it cannot be affirmed that it has been
or that it will be: if we were to say that being was or will be, in fact, we would fall into
contradiction, because in this case we could say that being “is no more” or “not yet”.
In this, Parmenides agrees with the Sarvasarvādins as he affirms that a being remains
itself and does not cease to exist (therefore it does not even become other than itself
but, at the most, it changes its perceptible qualities) over time.10 Being is therefore
ingenerated and immortal, since otherwise it would imply non-being.
9

A similar problem is presented by Nāgārjuna (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 10.1-2) concerning the
relationship between cause and effect: if there is a fire that burns, this happens only because it can
consume a fuel, therefore there is no fire without fuel, but fuel is also called “fuel” because it is consumed
by a fire. The two entities are therefore interdependent. If this were not admitted then one would
implicitly accept that the fire coincides with the fuel, but this would mean that the two are the same. The
agent and the object that undergoes the action would be the same thing. If the fire is other than the fuel,
[then] it would exist independently from the fuel. Severino, on the other hand, expresses himself in this
way: “in the result of becoming ash on the part of the wood, there is not only the ash, but also the having
become ash on the part of the wood, an impossible identification of non-identical. We can think of
avoiding the contradiction by saying that, in the becoming ash on the part of the wood, the wood becomes
nothing. […] And for this becoming to happen it is also necessary that the ash emerge from nothing: at
a certain point, nothing becomes ash, so the result of this becoming from nothing is the being ash on the
part of nothing” (Goggi 2019, 51-52). This statement is clearly inspired by Parmenides, for whom Being
is “all alike” (pân homoîon, frag. 8.22).
10
For the Sarvasarvādins (Willemen, et al. 1998, p. 20) any unit (dravya) is in itself an identity
(svabhāva), and in this sense this identity is not nominal or attributed, but is “the identical” in the
Severinian sense. For Severino, in fact, every entity that we see is an “identical”, that is, it is true and
eternal. This does not mean that it has an identity in the sense opposed by Buddhists: Severino’s
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In Severino’s neo-Parmenidean formulation, the principle of non-contradiction of
being becomes an inviolable and implicit fact of everything. Other philosophers who
have commented on his work have formulated it like this (Priest 2020, 47):
¬ ◊(A∧ ¬A)
The reader will notice how this formulation appears quite analogous to the one that
derives from the fourfold negation (catuṣkoṭi) of Nāgārjuna:
1.
2.
3.
4.

¬ (A);
¬ (¬A);
¬ (A ∧ ¬A);
¬ (¬A ∧ ¬¬A)

Specifically, it is the last logical implication, which includes the negation of any
possible alternative, which lends itself to being compared to that of Severino. However,
not everyone agrees in using this term and someone proposed this version: A∨¬A
which seems to me incorrect.11 Nevertheless, it is clear if we read any of Nāgārjuna’s
statements, such as in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (21.12-13):
na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo ’bhāvān na jāyate |
nābhāvāj jāyate ’bhāvo ’bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate || 12
1. (A from A): A being does not become from [another] being,
2. (¬A from A): nor a non-being [can] become from a being.
3. (A from ¬A): A being does not become from a non-being,
4. (¬A from ¬A): nor a non-being [can] become from a non-being.

Which lead to this conclusion:

“identical” is not an independent identity, but is a manifestation of Being, and for this reason it is as true
as Being in its totality (or rather: it contains in itself the totality of Being). This is also reflected in what
Nāgārjuna says: conventional truth (saṃvṛti) is not falsehood but only misunderstanding (like the
Parmenidean dóxa), and in fact it is not a different o secondary reality distinct from paramārtha as both
are satya. The saṃvṛti is an erroneous and partial view of the totality of paramārtha. To put it in
Severinian terms: since relative truth is a conventional misunderstanding of absolute reality, even though
it is only a partial vision of the Whole, it must nevertheless be as eternal as the Whole itself. A partial
truth is still a truth. This idea for which reality is One but perceived in different ways, giving the illusion
of being faced with different realities, is an aspect of Madhyamaka that has been compared with Wilfrid
Sellars’ philosophy of stereoscopic vision (Garfield 2019, 67-79).
11
If we “read the negation-symbols as just straight truth-functional negation, both this and the negation
of the third alternative turn out to be equivalent to A∨¬A, and it is obvious that this is not the conclusion
Nāgārjuna wants to draw” (Westerhoff 2009, 75). Priest believes that the only way to solve this problem
is to formulate the fourth principle as ¬A∧¬¬A but this would cause some logical problems (Priest 2010,
27). Traditional logic cannot explain catuṣkoṭi in an absolute sense since Nāgārjuna’s will is precisely
to reveal the aporia of language.
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na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate |
na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ || 13
1. ¬(A from A): A being does not become from itself,
2. ¬(A from ¬A): nor from other-than-itself,
3. ¬(A from A∧¬A): nor simultaneously from itself and from another. In what way,
then, will it be born?

At this point it is necessary to consider the Condition of Dialetheism. In fact, Priest
argues that it is possible for a given statement to be both true and false at the same time.
However, this condition cannot explain the aporia of language since the attribution of
nominal identity to entities is based on the assumption of truth. If I affirm that the
concept-form Ax corresponds to the name-signifier Ay I am also saying that the same
association is impossible between the same form Ax and a different signifier. If the
signifier is “triangle” and the form is △ then it is considered correct. If the same
signifier is attributed to the form □ then we perceive the statement as false.
When we affirm A = A we are operating a real doubling between two “A”s, one
image of the other, to allow this affirmation. But the same affirmation is the claim of
nominal attribution of language: the phonic execution [ˈeɪ] corresponds to the phoneme
/a/. In English obviously there are different possible pronunciations of the same
phoneme /a/, such as /a/ ≡ [a] ∧ [ɑ] ∧ [ɒ] ∧ [æ] ∧ [ə] ∧ [ɛ] ∧ [oː] ∧ [ɔ] ∧ [ e] ∧ [ʕ] ∧ [ʌ].
But this dialetheism does not deny the two-way principle of language: in fact, if one
begins to pronounce the phoneme /a/ as [k], he would fall into the contradiction:
because /a/ = ¬[k]. Likewise, the distinction of sonorities in English is pertinent: /k/ =
[k] ∧ ¬[g] that is: /k/ = [k] ∨ [g]. It cannot be both in English. In languages in which
the phonetic apparatus does not include sonority as a distinctive feature, then it will be
hypothetically possible to say that /k/ = [k] ∧ [g], but in fact these would be languages
other than English. Here the system repeats itself. A speaker (A) in whose language
sonority is a distinctive trait will perceive the system of a speaker (B) as contradictory
in a language where sonority is not a distinctive trait: A ≠ B.
Priest says that “The meaningfulness of a statement of the form ‘a is b’ presupposes
nothing about either the sense of the reference of ‘a’ and ‘b’” (Priest 2020, p. 59), not
realizing that such a statement simply lacks common sense. It is not a question here of
separating absolute logic from the contextuality of discourses, because we must not
forget that every system of reasoning, including logic and mathematics, derives from
language and functions exactly like human language. Therefore, if it is tolerable to
accept a system in which A = B it is only because language allows it, but admitting this
will does not solve the inherent problem of linguistic aporia, for which nominal
identities can function as a device only if one accepts dogmatically their absoluteness,
that is their independence, which however contradicts the reality of the system of signs,
for which each name takes its meaning from the opposition of all the other names within
the system.
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4. WILL, PREJUDICE AND KNOWLEDGE
BETWEEN GREECE AND INDIA
A famous medieval Latin proverb says nihil volitum quin praecognitum: “nothing is
wanted that is not already known”. In the light of what we have said so far, we could
interpret it as follows: the world populated by a multiplicity of different entities appears
to us this way also because a linguistic education acts as a preventive and prejudicial
form to our knowledge. Before we can recognize something by its nominal identity it
is in fact necessary that a certain meaning is already introjected into our conception of
the world. The object “book” appears to us because we have firstly learned to recognize
something as “book”, but to recognize literally means “to know again” (re-cognōscere),
because that notion is already within us, we first learned it through education. Cognition
therefore acts as an obstacle between the sight of reality and our understanding of it.
In a peculiar metaphor Vasubandhu describes this problem as if our vision was
hampered by a cataract: “Since it manifests itself as an unreal object, this world is mere
conceptualization, just as an observer with cataract vision of hair on the moon would
be” (Viṃśatikā: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ).12 Now, Vasubandhu’s original background
was precisely the Sarvāstivāda school, and it is not illogical to think that his Yogacāra
is a further development of this school, since Yogacāra elements have already been
detected in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Kritzer 2005).
This brings us to the last of the comparisons that I propose between the thought of
Parmenides and Buddhism. In fact, it is not simple the conception of eternalism that
can suggest a comparison. The consequences of this theory in fact lead to two similar
conclusions about the nature of human perception.
hōs gàr hekástot’ékhei krâsis meléōn polyplágktōn, tṑs nóos anthrṓpoisi parístatai.
tò gàr aŷtó estin hóper phronéei meléōn phýsis anthrṓpoisin kaì pâsin kaì pantí.
tò gàr pléon estì nóēma.
For men’s mind comes to them at each time in accordance with the mixture of their
much-wandering frame.
For to all men and to each the nature of the frame is the same as what it thinks.
For what preponderates (sc. in the frame) is the thought. (Parmenides, frag. 16)13

Vlastos puts forward the fascinating hypothesis that in these verses of Parmenides there
are the foundations to support the theory of the identity of perceiver and perceived,
which is, the identity of subject and object (Vlastos 1946, p. 67, 68). At the end of the
path of enlightenment, the revelation of the identity of subject and object is obviously

12

Original: vijñaptimātram evaitad asad arthāvabhāsanāt yathā taimirikasyāsat keśa candrādi
darśanam.
13
The translation of the fragment was taken from Vlastos’ article on the theory of knowledge in
Parmenides (Vlastos 1946, 66).
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also supported by Nāgārjuna (Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, 23.16-17).14 The doctrine of
the deceitfulness 15 of sensory perceptions is therefore probably implicit in the very
vision of the unity of Being, as its consequent and necessary admission.
Similarly, there is in Parmenides something very similar to the statement of the
impossibility of language to express the paramārtha. For Parmenides it is rather the
impossibility of the human to think of Being. This leads to a kind of double nature: that
of the wanderer, who sees things as becoming, and that of the “unshaken heart” (frag.
1.29: atremés) which can see the Being. Scholars have questioned whether this view is
to be interpreted as a dualism or not, but I believe that the answer has already been
given and that it coincides with the Mādhyamika theory of dve satye: there is no duality,
only different perceptions of a single truth (Duckworth 2018).
The dualistic vision is the aspect of relative reality, which sees Being as split: on
the one hand being as a perceived object, and on the other, Being as a perceiving subject.
These two Beings are actually the same Being perceiving itself. This is how mortals
“build in their mind to name two forms” (frag. 8.53-54: tō ̂ n mían oŷ khreṓn estin).
Also, for Parmenides this world constructed by the mind, the world of opinions (dóxa)
is a world populated by an (apparent) plurality of nominal entities. At the end of his
analysis on the problem of the Name in Parmenides, Woodbury comes to the following
conclusions:
Name and world are reciprocally dependent, since a name implies that world of named.
Name and world are reciprocally dependent, since a name implies that a world of which it
is a name and the world, which must find expression, can find it only if the name is used
of itself. (Woodbury 1958, 157)

This peculiar relationship between name and world can already be seen in the most
ancient Buddhist texts, such as Lokasutta (AN 4.23), Lokasamudayasutta (SN 35.107),
and Pupphasutta (SN 22) in which we read about an entity of a world in the world (loke
lokadhammo).16 In the other texts mentioned the central theme is the origin and the end
of the world (lokassa aṭṭhaṅgamo or lokanta, loka-anta). While the origin of the world
(lokassa samudayo) is linked to the very foundation of cognitive misunderstanding
(from the five aggregates to the attribution of name and form) the end of the world is
instead a power that is acquired with the very condition of Buddhahood, and that
coincides with the end of the feeding of the conditioned production chain. In numerous
texts the figure of the meditator as that of the destroyer of the world (lokantagū). For
the Mahāsāṃghikas the Buddha, by virtue of his awakened condition, is not confused
14

avidyamāne grāhe ca mithyā vā samyag eva vā | bhaved viparyayaḥ kasya bhavet kasyāviparyayaḥ ||
na cāpi viparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ | na cāpy aviparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ ||: “The
instrument of perception, the perception itself, the conceiving subject, the perceived object, everything
is pacified. Therefore, perception is not detected. But if the perception is not given, whether false or true,
to whom can we attribute the misunderstanding or clarity? We cannot attribute misunderstanding to one
who is subject to misunderstanding, nor to one who has not been”.
15
Vlastos himself uses the expression “doctrine of the deceitfulness” (Vlastos 1946, 71).
16
“The form, oh beggars, is a norm of the world in the world that the Buddha understands and
comprehends” (rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, loke lokadhammo taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti).
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with the worldly nature (laukika) of other human beings. He is supramundane
(lokottara), “beyond the world”.
antavān yadi lokaḥ syāt paralokaḥ kathaṃ bhavet |
athāpy anantavāl lokaḥ paralokaḥ kathaṃ bhavet ||
If the world had an end, how could there be another world?
If the world had no end, how could another world be created?
(Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 27.21)

Nāgārjuna himself refers to relative reality as “mundane and conventional truth”
(lokasaṃvr̥tisatyaṃ).17 What is in the world belongs to the world, and is inevitably
convention, reduction of cognitive space. In fact, as Sasaki reminds us: “the relative
represents the things which are considered as existents from the viewpoint of
conventional usage (lokanirutti), but not in reality. These things are relative and
transitory. They assume a form of limitation also. They reveal themselves as the relative.
The relative is a form of manifestation or indication (paññatti). Both the things,
absolute and relative, are thus involved in paññatti” (Sasaki 1986, 82).
Let us now return to the problem of time and momentariness. Admitting therefore,
as we have said so far, that the human being is misled by an illusory knowledge, is it
possible that this obstructed perception also gives rise to a wrong conception of time
and the momentary nature of entities?
sataś ca tāvad bhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate |
ekatve na hi bhāvaś ca nābhāvaś copapadyate ||
The annihilation of what exists is impossible. In fact, existence as well as the [affirmation
of] non-existence both refer to one and only being, and are therefore illogical.
(Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 7.30)

The whole theory of the Abhidhamma on the nature of entities (dhammavāda) believes
that reality can be analyzed down to its first constituents, namely the dhammas. Already
at this level the dhammic reality can be understood as absolute or relative. There is in
fact only one unconditioned dhamma, which is nibbāna. The conditioned dhammas, on
the other hand, are manifold, and are divided into momentary, cognition-based and
material phenomena. Here, the Vaibhāṣika philosophy disagrees on the momentary
nature of the dhammas, which instead believes them to be always permanent.
Consistent with this position, in fact, for the Vaibhāṣikas “there is no movement in an
ultimate sense. […] Motion is not something that exists in reality (dravyatas), but is a
name given to the appearance of momentary elements in adjacent locations
17

The concept of loka maybe has to be recognized as far more important than that of dhamma, and
Karunadasa himself states incredibly that all the implications of the fundamental teaching of the Buddha,
that is, the dependent arising, are in the way Buddhists understand loka “the world” and sabba “the
whole” (Karunadasa 2018, 25). If Karunadasa is correct, this ancient importance of the very idea of the
Whole (sabba) is also the conceptual ground on which concepts like paramattha and tattva arose.
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(deśāntarotpatti). If somebody retracted her arm or stretched it forth, in an ultimate
sense, it is incorrect to say that her arm moved. What actually happened was that the
series of momentary elements that constituted what was called “the arm” arose in
adjacent locations in a certain direction. Only the place of the arising of elements had
changed, not a single element had moved” (Karunadasa 2020, 68-69).
In the neo-Parmenidean conception of Severino, time is likewise conceived as a
sort of coordinate that relates the continuous appearing and disappearing of entities
(Totaro 2020, 15). The fact that certain phenomena appear to our cognition does not
mean that they begin to exist, nor does their disappearance coincide with their ceasing
to exist. Everything is a relationship of entities that are placed inside or outside our
field of perceptual appearance. This relationship gives the illusion of becoming but, in
reality, these entities that appear and disappear are eternal and immutable, fixed. At
this point it is necessary to specify what is the conception of becoming in the NeoParmenidean philosophy to avoid confusion. Severino defines becoming as the
nihilistic conception according to which a certain entity is believed to become
something else, different than what it is. When we see the term “becoming” used in
Neo-Parmenidean philosophy we must therefore understand it as the erroneous
appearance that things may change in their substantial identity, a position that is
partially shared by the Abhidhamma who believes in the sabhāva of dhammas, but
accepts that they cease to exist when their function is exhausted, while the Vaibhāṣika
Abhidharma accepts instead that the dharmas exist in all temporal aspects (past, present
and future), therefore even when they have ceased their function or are no longer visible.
These are positions that involve radical considerations of the ancient concept of aniccā
(impermanence) as well as that of anattā (non-self or non-identity), and which in fact
also call into question the position of Nāgārjuna, evidently critical of Abhidharmic
constructions but that would need a separate treatment given the complexity of this
subject.18
18

Although in fact the Abhidharmic terminologies have inspired Nāgārjuna, it must also be said that his
position is in clear disagreement with the fundamental assumptions of the intrinsic identity of dharmas.
This also calls into question the studies of de Cea (2005) who attempted to demonstrate how Nāgārjuna’s
philosophy is anti-Abhidharmic and instead centered on the fundamental positions of Early Buddhism,
and so when he uses abhidharmic terms, such as paramārtha and svabhāva, he does so with different
meanings (in the first case) or to deconstruct its assumptions (in the second case). Beyond de Cea’s work,
however, this problem should be explored in a second article which I will work on later. For now, I
would like to point out these fundamental aspects: The term suñña appears only a few times in the Pāli
canon, but every time it occurs it is evident that it is a synonym of anattā or at least of its strengthened
form. The Pāli canon refers to identity with the term atta. The act can be applied to both people and
objects. If a thing can be named then it is given an identity, and the same goes for psychological identity.
It should also be noted that anattā and suñña are perfectly synonymous. The term sabhāva never appears,
therefore it is to be thought that the Pāli canon does not distinguish between identity and intrinsic identity.
The term sabhāva is an Abhidhammic innovation, perhaps with the aim of specifying that, according to
the theory of its authors, there were entities that could instead be considered “self-existing” (√sva-bhāva).
Therefore, when Nāgārjuna uses the term svabhāva it must be understood in an anti-Abhidhammic
function. He speaks explicitly on many occasions of the emptiness of ātman, but implicitly he also
includes svabhāva in this category: “emptiness in the MMK means both emptiness of self and emptiness
of svabhāva” (de Cea 2005, 517). Despite this, the emptiness of the svabhāva is one of the central
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But what does this appearing and disappearing come from, the Buddhists tell us.
Severino just writes that as long as it is impossible for us to conceive of Being as a
totality, then we see it partially, and in this partial vision parts of Being appear and
disappear, inconceivable as the indivisible infinity that in reality is. But if we look at
the Abhidhamma we realize that this partial appearance of beings (which are aspects
of Being) is due to the limitation of our cognitive means, that is, by particular causes
and conditions.
Things arise, that is, they appear to us, but 1) nothing arises without the appropriate
causes and conditions. Furthermore, 2) nothing arises from a single cause, but from a
set of several concomitant elements, and 3) no phenomenon arises isolated, single, and
solitary, divided from the others (ekassa dhammassa uppatti paṭisedhitā hoti), precisely
because the effects of causes and conditions are always multiple interconnected
phenomena. These are the three postulates of the Abhidhamma (Karunadasa 2020, p.
130). It is no coincidence that the Buddha is called “the one who has gone beyond time”
(gataddha) which is specifically the saṃsāric time (saṃsāraddham atikkanta) or, more
specifically, the very concept of duration (addhan).
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have tried to demonstrate that common positions between Greek and
Buddhist thought can be found since the most ancient forms of the two philosophies.
In the various declinations of Buddhist thought there are, mutatis mutandis, numerous
points of convergence with statements of Parmenides and with the neo-Parmenidean
formulations of Emanuele Severino.
With the term “Being”, Severino means “a semantic complex or concreteness
whose abstract moments are formal Being and the determination of this formality”
(Stella, et al. 2020, 54). The beings (essenti) in Severinian terms are therefore not
separated from each other, but interconnected in a network that constitutes a real
semantic structure that he defines as “Primal Structure”. A more important implication
of this interconnectedness is also their implicit inseparability.19 This is important to
concepts in Nāgārjuna’s work, therefore explicitly in controversy against this “Abhidhammic innovation,”
which he probably intended as a new and more sophisticated way of understanding identity, which
however does not prove it in any way. Since there is no difference between Nagarjuna’s sunyata and the
Pali anatta (ibid., 518) it is clear at this point that Nāgārjuna notes (and opposes to) a clear contradiction
in the Abhidhamma. The Abhidhammic system poses a fundamental distinction: 1) the psyche on the
one hand, populated by minimal cognitive data (paññatti) which, however, are shown to the analysis
only ephemeral constructs without intrinsic identity; and 2) physical reality on the other hand, which is
considered objectively real and populated by minimal structural units (dhamma). Nāgārjuna opposes this
dualism by also reducing physical reality to a psycholinguistic construct, or rather: both physical and
psychological reality are diminished by the same laws, which can be understood as linguistic laws. With
this, however, there is a distortion with respect to the Abhidhammic positions, since all dharmas are seen
as impermanent (anityā) conventions or conventionally existent (prajñapti-sat), and therefore ephemeral
(śūnya).
19
Already in the Abhidhamma, which probably inspired Nāgārjuna on many points, it is clearly stated
that any conditioned dhamma, by its very nature, is totally devoid of power or sway of its own:
dhammānaṃ savasavattitābhimāno paṭisedhito hoti (Karunadasa 2020, 131).
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understand because in the thesis that we want to propose here, the meaning of multiple
beings is the same as the dharmas in Madhyamaka theory.
It is essential to speak of interdependence and not of mere dependence. If A depends
on B it is not implied that B depends on something else, as the meaning of “dependence”
indicates that only the dependent element needs the other to be substantiated. On the
other hand, interdependence implies that the identity of A and B are mutually attributed,
but this means that A depends on B as much as B depends on A, like two cards
supporting each other in a house of cards.
Severino often speaks of “identity” in an almost absolute sense, which refers not so
much to the Buddhist ātman as to the Nāgārjunian tattva, that is, something that has no
differences because it includes in itself all the possibilities (therefore also all the
differences). However, the way in which Severino considers it presents some problems:
Severino does not accept a ground that is not determined and semanticised, and thus he
does not accept an authentic unity, but he interprets unity as unification, which is
determined by virtue of the determinateness of the unified determinations. […] To
conclude, we can say that, from a certain point of view, Severino intends to lift duality in
the unity and, thus, to achieve the authentic unity; but, from another point of view, he
intends to maintain the determinateness and, thus, the relation, which represents a
unification, not a unity, because it relies on the duality of the related terms, by virtue of
which it maintains its determinateness. (Stella, et al. 2020, 69)

Let’s see what we can say about the concept of tattva in Nāgārjuna’s thought. If we
accept Nāgārjuna’s description of reality as having ontological value, then it
immediately becomes clear that, for him, Being is not the total of its manifestations,
nor the sum of every possible manifestation: “tattva is free of conceptualizations – the
distinct objects that our concepts produce are merely our creations” (Jones 2020, 13),
and among these “objects”, which are mental objects, the idea of Being is also included
as it is included the idea of its opposite (non-being). But, we must reiterate it, “tattva is
not an entity or collection of entities” (ibidem).
Being as a unit is for Severino the “Whole” that has no otherness as every “other”
is in the Being, so that there is no “other” that it is nothing other than Being: “Being is
open because the relation that constitutes it is the same relation that opens it to the
difference, since the latter is included in Being” (Stella, et al. 2020, 55).
Although Being is per se notum we must deal with the cognitive mediation of
language. This is an unclear aspect in Severino’s works, who limits himself to affirming
that the phenomenological immediacy of being is substantiated in its affirmation:
“Being is”. And so far I have nothing to object to. But how do we solve the Buddhist
problem of the nihilistic perception of reality? How to explain the impermanence that
appears to us in all identities?
Severino would say that it is known by itself that Being is, but the Buddha has
another problem: who am “I”? Or better: what is “I”?
On the other side, “Nāgārjuna uses “svabhāva” only in connection with bhāvas and
dharmas—i.e., alleged entities of one sort or another—not tattva. Tattva is not a type
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of entity that is an alternative to bhāvas and dharmas. Thus, there is no ultimate entities,
but there is an “ultimate reality” (tattva)” (Jones 2020, 19).
In conclusion, in this article I have tried to demonstrate how the philosophical
questions that Early Buddhism posed are in many respects analogous to those found in
ancient Greek philosophy, and we have seen the case of Parmenides. Not only the
questions, but also the answers and the ways in which they are sought, are in many
respects similar. The philosophical question between the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma
and Nāgārjuna on the problem of the intrinsic identity (svabhāva) of dharmas recalls
equally contemporary problems in the neo-Parmenidean movements about eternalism
and nihilism. These problems concern the perception of reality, the philosophy of
language and cognition, i.e. issues of increasing relevance nowadays, but the way in
which I tried to introduce the problems is trans-philosophical and trans-cultural, that is,
it uses the tools and philosophical views provided by a certain philosophy to study the
analogous problems of another, and vice versa. This gaze that interpenetrates two
distinct visions is also the suggestion that this paper wants to give to the philosophical
sciences to address contemporary issues by going beyond philosophical comparativism,
and ‘contaminating’ the philosophical visions with each other in the perspective of that
Trans-cultural philosophy suggested by authors such as Valera (1972). Transculturality
is a tool that allows us to make dialogue on equal terms two philosophical visions,
produced in a different historical, social, and linguistic background, but which we
firmly believe that they can contribute equally to the philosophical sciences.
For the purpose of this article, I tried to demonstrate that both in Parmenidean and
neo-Parmenidean philosophy, as well as in the very basis of ancient Buddhist thought
(later reformulated several times above all by Nāgārjunian ‘absolutism’ and
Sarvāstivāda eternalism) we find the affirmation of an ultimate reality, immutable and
unspeakable by language,20 an infinite Whole not included in the limitations of human
20

Regarding Nāgārjuna’s position, clearly hinged on a linguistic-cognitive formulation (Westerhoff
2017), it must be said that it is in many respects referable to that of the Abhidhamma, with the difference
that Nāgārjuna applies the same quality of “cognitively constructed” also to dharmas. The quality of
saṃvr̥ti is in fact prajñapti “conceptual”, although the conventional reality depends on the absolute one.
A conception clearly taken from the Abhidhammic paññatti. For the Abhidhamma there are two types
of designation: the nominal one (nāma-paññatti) and the semantic one (attha-paññatti). Both cases refer
to a clear linguistic conception of conventional reality (sammuti). Indeed, this distinction between nāma
and attha also recalls the Saussurian dualism between signifier and signified, which too, as elements of
the “two-sided” sign, are conventional designations (paññatti) that pertain to name and meaning. As
conventions, they are unable to describe objective reality, which is believed to be populated by dhammas.
Conventions are arbitrary and therefore for the Abhidhamma they are substantially the opposite of the
objective dhammic reality, and although a dhamma can be appealed by a name, this does not make it
describable by conventional language, which is worldly (lokiya) and therefore linked to the conventional
conception of reality. Only the language of the Buddhas is real, but it is also ultramundane (lokuttara).
It should be keep in mind, however, that while the Abhidhamma considers paññattis and dhammas as
distinct (Karunadasa 2020), for Nāgārjuna also the dharmas belong to the sphere of prajñapti-sat, thus
introducing what later evolved into an even more radical conception in the Yogācāra which considers
all the experienceable reality as having a cognitive matrix (cittamātra). Only the condition of
Buddhahood remains, even in these cases, the sole capable of transcending language and seeing reality
as it is (tattva).
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cognition, therefore misunderstood by the discernment of false opinions as a reality
populated by multiple entities, which appear and disappear giving us the illusion of
becoming.21 These entities are cognitively isolated, considered separate, but, in reality,
they are impermanent, both because their arising is determined by mutual causes and
conditions, and also because they are nothing but multiple aspects of the Whole (tattva),
which is indivisible. The two realities, the absolute and the relative, are both truths, but
the first is infinite while the second is finite.
Naturally, these issues open the broadest horizons to possible further philosophical
insights from a trans-cultural perspective and which can be developed in the space of a
future research.
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